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i 
Abstract 
 
Every day the media is filled with examples of the ways in which contemporary social, 
economic, and political life transcends national borders. Some researchers argue that these 
dynamics attest to the emergence of a global civil society, based on a set of universal norms and 
practices that works in tandem with or may even supercede national politics. Yet we know little 
about the ways in which global institutions resonate with the everyday lives of individuals and 
with the organizations that actually serve people on the ground. How do ordinary people learn 
about and conceptualize these universal rights and how do they claim them?  To what extent do 
NGOs articulate comparable notions about rights, pursue common strategies to achieve them, 
and by so doing, contribute to this emerging architecture of transnational governance?  This 
paper uses the case of Congolese refugees in South Africa to explore these questions.  It 
examines how individuals learn about and use global norms and practices and how this learning 
process varies in their home and host-country context.  It also explores the extent to which 
organizations operating both locally and internationally are exposed to a set of global approaches 
and expectations and how these influence how things get done. 
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Refugee Rights and Wrongs: 
Global Cultural Diffusion among the Congolese in South Africa1
 
Peggy Levitt and Sarah Wagner2
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The media is filled each day with examples of the ways in which contemporary social, economic, 
and political life transcends national borders.  There are stories of environmental rights and anti-
poverty activists working through Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) networks, rather than 
national governments to accomplish their goals. Transnational governance regimes, to which 
nation states become signatories, establish universal protections and regulations for all 
individuals, regardless of their citizenship.  Some researchers argue that these dynamics attest to 
the emergence of a global civil society, based on a set of universal norms and practices, that 
works in tandem with or may even supercede national politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Rivera-
Salgado 1999, Brysk 2000, Khagram, et al 2002).  Yet we know little about the ways in which 
global norms and practices resonate with the everyday lives of individuals and with the 
organizations that actually serve people on the ground. How do ordinary people learn about and 
conceptualize these universal rights and how do they claim them?  To what extent do NGOs 
articulate comparable notions about rights, pursue common strategies to achieve them, and by so 
doing, contribute to this emerging architecture of transnational governance? 
 
This paper uses the case of Congolese refugees in South Africa to explore these questions.  Its 
goal is to put ethnographic flesh on the bones of what is normally a theoretical discussion.  The 
refugee experience is particularly interesting because it provides a window onto two distinct 
layers of global civil society.  First, it sheds light on how individuals learn about and use global 
norms and practices and how this learning process varies in their home and host-country context. 
Second, the refugee experience reveals the ways in which organizations learn about and put into 
practice universal values and strategies.  Organizations operating both locally and internationally 
are exposed to a set of global approaches and expectations that may or may not influence how 
things get done. We use the case of Congolese refugees in South Africa to explore these 
processes both in isolation and in relation to one another.  We look to the literature on 
transnational politics, world culture, and global cultural diffusion to guide our inquiry. 
 
This paper is based on fieldwork carried out during mid July and August of 2002.  We 
interviewed forty individuals and held four focus-group interviews (with the number of 
participants ranging from five to twelve).  Only a small number had official refugee status. Most 
respondents were illegal immigrants who had some sort of interim identification papers issued 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to thank Ann Beater, Loren Landau, Thomas Cushman, Karen Jacobsen, Sharon 
Russell and Tara May for their help with this research projects and for their comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. 
2 Peggy Levitt is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Wellesley College. She is also 
a Research Fellow at the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations and the Weatherhead Center for 
International Affairs at Harvard University.  Please send correspondence to plevitt@wellesley.edu.  Sarah 
Wagner is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University.  Please send 
correspondence to sewagner@fas.harvard.edu. 
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either by the South African government or by an NGO.  We refer to the individuals we 
interviewed as refugees throughout this paper, regardless of their official status.  
 
Staff and summer interns at Jesuit Relief Services (JRS - the United Nations High Commission 
on Refugees’ (UNHCR’s) principal implementing partner in Johannesburg) facilitated our initial 
entrees into the Congolese community.  From there we branched out, following leads from 
community organizations and churches, to gather as varied a sample as possible given our time 
constraints.  About one half of our interviews were conducted in English and the other half were 
assisted or directly interpreted by a Congolese man who spoke English, French, Lingala, and 
Swahili.  Most interviews took 45 to 60 minutes and were held in the refugees’ homes, churches, 
a health clinic, or the JRS office.  Interviews were also conducted with representatives from the 
refugee service agencies and government offices although, despite repeated attempts, we were 
unable to speak with a representative from the UNHCR.  Given the brevity of our field work and 
the small number of interviews we conducted, our study is only suggestive of possible trends.  
 
II. THEORETICAL DEBATES 
 
This project is informed by at least three, sometimes overlapping bodies of literature including 
work on transnational governance, politics, and civil society; research on global culture; and the 
body of work on the diffusion of innovations, ideas, and institutions. 
 
Many contemporary political and civic activities are organized transnationally, using resources, 
vocabularies, and strategies that address the needs of constituencies spanning borders.  Much 
recent research attempts to understand the ways in which elite and labor migrants remain active 
in the political and civic affairs of their sending communities even as they establish themselves 
in the countries that receive them (Levitt 2001, Portes et al. 1999, Guarnizo et al. 2003).   There 
is also a growing body of work on global civil society that highlights how nongovernmental 
organizations operating across borders effectively advocate for universal concerns (Fox and 
Brown 1998, Khagram et al. 2002). 
 
These literatures inform this inquiry because the ideas and values professed by the actors in this 
study are shaped transnationally.3  There is a set of widely-recognizable goals, associated with 
global modernity, that are promulgated by transnational institutions, the academy, NGOs, and the 
media.  We refer to these here as a “global values package” in which we include such things as 
democracy, global equity, good governance, institutional building, sustainability, the rule of law, 
and human rights. But one set of questions this work has not sufficiently addressed is how actors 
learn about global ideas and practices and how they act upon them.  Individuals who migrate 
carry with them some pre-established compromise between local and global cultural models.  
When refugees and migrants move, they need to renegotiate this compromise with respect to 
their new home.  
 
                                                 
3 Transnational politics also refers to political activism that is structured, financed, and led across borders.  
Transnational political organization is not necessarily designed to nor does it accomplish transnational 
political goals.  Immigrant political parties, for example, can be organized transnationally in support of a 
home-country candidate or to bring about homeland regime change. 
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World-Polity theorists and Neo-institutionalists propose one way of understanding global 
cultural diffusion.4  Much of this literature argues that there is a universalistic or global level of 
cultural and organizational formation that creates and strongly influences states, business 
enterprises, groups, and individuals.  More and more, actors define themselves and their interests 
in response to the global cultural and organizational structures in which they are embedded (Boli 
and Thomas 1999, Meyer 2003).  Because the definitions, principles, purposes, and modes of 
action that constitute and motivate actors comprise a global level of social reality, actors around 
the world do things in the same way.  Although global actors act back, changing, adapting, and 
restructuring the global polity, some scholars claim that the structural isomorphism that 
characterizes the “actors, interests, and behavior in the world polity operates increasingly via 
top-down rather than “bottom-up processes” (Boli and Thomas 1999:5). 
 
Other scholars see global cultural production as an encounter between the global and the local.  
Instead of conceptualizing the global as macro-level  political and economic forces that stand in 
opposition to local cultural elements, they explore where and how the global and the local meet, 
and the ways in which power hierarchies, as well as relations of reciprocity and solidarity, shape 
these encounters  (Hannerz 1992, Gupta and Ferguson 1997, Ong 1999, Merry 2003).  
Appadurai’s (1996) notions of ethnoscapes, ideoscapes, and mediascapes bring to light how 
social actors use resources and construct identities that transcend traditional political and social 
boundaries and layers. 
 
We see the Congolese case as an empirical example of a negotiated encounter between the global 
and the local.  The refugees in our study are embedded in multi-sited, multi-layered transnational 
fields that bring global cultural elements into play with local responses.  Their experiences reveal 
both how cultural blending works and some inherent limits to the extent to which it occurs. 
 
III. THE CONGOLESE - SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION 
 
Following The Congo’s independence from Belgium in 1960, a series of coups ended with 
Joseph Mobutu seizing power.  He renamed the country Zaire and ruled for thirty years that were 
characterized by brutality, corruption, and widespread human rights abuses.  In the early 1990s, 
opposition groups from within the Congo, some of which had been working for several decades, 
joined with international movements, to begin to pressure Mobutu to step down.  
 
In 1994, about1.3 million ethnic Hutus fled persecution to refugee camps in the Eastern Congo.  
Hutu militia forces followed suit when a Tutsi-led government came to power in Rwanda in 
1996.  The Hutu militia joined forces with the Zaire Armed Forces (FAZ) to launch a campaign 
against Congolese ethnic Tutsis, who in turn formed their own militia that was backed by the 
Rwandan government.  The Tutsi militia - Alliances des Forces Democratique pour la 
Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) – was led by Laurent Kabila, who planned to oust Mobutu.  
In 1997, after failed peace talks with Mobutu, Kabila marched unchallenged into Kinshasa and 
proclaimed himself president.  Mobutu fled to Morocco and died that year.  
 
                                                 
4 Strang and Soule (1998) have written a comprehensive account of this research.  We use it selectively to 
organize and interpret our findings.   
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Tensions between ethnic groups increased and neighboring countries took sides, placing the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in the center of a complex series of foreign civil wars.  
In August, 1998, rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda rose up against Kabila’s government, 
which was backed by Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola.  Rebel forces gained control of the 
majority of the eastern Congo and, thus, the DRC’s bloody civil war began.  In July and August 
1999, six heads of state and all rebel leaders signed the Lusaka Peace Accords, which outlined a 
plan to disarm all armed groups, remove foreign forces and create an inter-party dialogue on the 
political future of the DRC.  However, little effort was made by any of the parties to enforce the 
agreement.  
 
In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was shot and killed by his bodyguard. His son, Joseph Kabila, 
took power and proceeded with the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Addis Ababa that October.  The 
dialogue made little progress, but reconvened in Pretoria in February, where an agreement was 
signed by most delegates. The Rwandese-backed Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-
Goma5 (RCD-Goma) and opposition party Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social6 
(UDPS) refused to sign the agreement and instead formed their own coalition --- Alliance to 
Save the Dialogue (ASD). In May 2002, a UN panel reported that warring parties were 
“prolonging the conflict to plunder national resources.” 
 
Since 1994, the year of the first free, democratic national election, South Africa in general, and 
Johannesburg in particular, has become the destination for thousands of migrants, refugees, and 
asylum seekers.7  Governmental, international, and local institution representatives agree it is 
impossible to know how many refugees now live in the country (Centre for Policy Studies 
1998:6).  Official statistics range from 2 to 11 million (Reitzes 1997:1).  The post-apartheid 
government responded by drafting the 1998 Refugee Act.  This legislation sought to align 
national immigration policy with international standards, as well as to facilitate the processing 
and servicing of thousands of foreign residents (USCR 2000).  Backlogs in asylum and refugee 
claims had so stagnated the system that 23,000 cases remained undecided in 2000. 
 
The number of refugees who had left the Congo was estimated at over 415,000 at the end of 
2002 (UNHCR 2003).  The Congolese are said to be the largest refugee population in South 
Africa; an estimated 26,000 refugees are concentrated in Johannesburg but also live in Cape 
Town, Pretoria, Durban and Port Elizabeth.   Most arrived between 1998-1999, although a 
smaller, more well-established group has been in South Africa for more than a decade. The 
majority of the Congolese refugees in South Africa are quite poor although according to JRS 
staff, a small group who were well-off in the Congo, support themselves by maintaining business 
interests there.  There are also a good number of economic migrants from the DRC who have 
been able to establish themselves successfully in South Africa.  Relatively strong, though narrow 
social networks characterize the Congolese refugee community.  Congolese are known to offer 
                                                 
5 Congolese Rally for Democracy. 
6 Union for Democracy and Social Progress. 
7 South Africa did not accept refugees under apartheid, but it did have a tradition of labor migration. Prior 
to 1996, whites who entered the country could become South African citizens while blacks remained 
under a work permit regime.  South African law did not distinguish between voluntary and forced 
migration.  The Congolese influx is not the first major wave to enter the country, as many Mozambicans 
fled to South Africa during the fifteen years of civil war that followed its  independence in the 1970s.  
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each other accommodation or lend money to each other, although long-standing regional and 
tribal subdivisions determine between whom.  Most service providers perceive the community as 
unorganized and characterized by regional and ethnic divisions which make it difficult for people 
to agree.  There is, therefore, no formal way to mobilize or communicate with the community.  
 
A network of organizations has been created or has expanded their programs to serve refugees.  
In addition to JRS, there are several other NGOs and church-related groups that provide health 
care or social services.  The South African government’s Department of Home Affairs is 
responsible for the asylum process.  There is also a group of advocacy organizations that defend 
refugee rights but are not direct service providers.  
 
IV. THE DIFFUSION OF IDEAS AND PRACTICES AMONG INDIVIDUALS    
 
Civil war and unrest have plagued the Congo for nearly five decades.  Most respondents had 
some kind of contact with civic organizations or the government before they left the Congo but 
they were deeply distrustful of both.  They declared, almost unanimously, that widespread 
corruption would plague any kind of regime and, therefore, they preferred to solve their 
problems on their own.  
 
Several types of groups stepped in to fill this leadership gap. Churches were a powerful force in 
the Congo.  Nearly all respondents said they belonged to some Protestant or Catholic Church and 
that going to church provided them with critical social support. If you want to reach the 
Congolese community, everyone agreed, the best way is to go to church.  Furthermore, some 
individuals worked for diamond and gold mining companies that provided basic services such as 
health care, education, and law enforcement services. Others claimed that it was Congolese 
families and neighbors who helped one another when there was some kind of problem.  They did 
not need the government or the police, they said, because family members or those living next 
door would step in.  A number of respondents also waxed nostalgic for the Mobutu dictatorship.  
They were perfectly willing to be ruled by military police if that would allow them to live in 
peace.  
 
The extent to which Congolese refugees are informed about life in South Africa before they 
migrate is unclear. Most respondents said they had only limited contact with their relatives in the 
Congo because communication between South Africa and the DRC was so poor.  Writing or 
phoning was nearly impossible because the Congolese postal and telephone systems barely 
functioned.  Several respondents, however, used the internet to learn what was going on at home. 
A strikingly large number had e-mail addresses they used at internet cafes around town.8  The 
vast majority said they watched South African T.V. and tried to read the newspaper but that 
because they spoke French and South Africans spoke English this was often very difficult.  
 
Most people came from the Congo with some prior exposure to the tenets of global culture.  
Several people said they learned about human rights in school. Others had learned about them 
working at jobs with nongovernmental organizations, the police, or health care providers.  One 
                                                 
8 A sample survey carried out in Johannesburg in 2002 found that the Congolese respondents were in 
fairly regular contact with people back home, mainly over the internet, suggesting quite a strong flow of 
information (Landau, personal communication).   
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woman learned about her rights at the union she belonged to.  A number of people knew about 
the “International Days or Years” sponsored by the United Nations. They knew, for example, 
that “the 8th day of March is a day that they speak about the rights of women.”  They 
remembered observing these celebrations at school and hearing about them on the TV.   A 
smaller number had also heard about international laws, such as The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.  These tended to be refugees with some college education or who were internet 
savvy.  One man who carried a copy of the Universal Declaration with him said that someone 
had given him the website address of the World Service Authority and that he had e-mailed them 
and received a pamphlet in response.  
 
Although it is difficult to summarize respondents’ understanding of rights, there were some 
common themes that came up in many of their answers to our questions. They generally equated 
human rights with the idea of security and safety. “It is the right to live,” said Freddy Jr. a thirty-
one year old male, “the right to grow in society among your people, in general the right to live as 
a human being.”  Many felt that human rights meant that people could live without fear and that 
it was the government’s responsibility to guarantee this.  They believed that people were entitled 
to a house and a job and to be able to go where they pleased. Others differentiated between what 
is written and what actually occurs.  One man, for example, commented that although The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is very clear, the people that are working 
(implementing/protecting human rights) don’t know or respect these rights. 
 
A refugee, most respondents said, is someone who comes for exile in another country in search 
of a safe place. It is someone who has run away from his or her own country because of trouble 
or because of politics. Refugees, they felt, should have the right to get papers that would enable 
them to move around freely, to get food, to study. The country that takes you in should be 
willing to protect you. If not, you should be allowed to settle elsewhere.  There was some 
disagreement about whether refugees should be entitled to the same rights as citizens or whether 
they should receive basic protections but not necessarily equal treatment.  
 
Some respondents had also heard about women’s rights.  They felt that women should be able to 
do what men do – to work, to go to school. It seemed to them that South African women had 
made greater gains than their Congolese counterparts in this respect.  Here in Johannesburg, 
women can serve in the government.  South African women, it seemed, were also less likely to 
be beaten by their husbands.  
 
Refugees bring these experiential and cognitive categories with them when they resettle in a new 
country and use them to interpret what they encounter (Dimaggio 1987). Their cultural 
understandings influenced what new ideas and practices they adopted and the ways in which old 
ideas are revised to make sense of the South African context.  Andrew, a thirty-five year old 
male, felt that few people left the Congo with any proper concept of what a government should 
do. He said, “When I crossed over into Zambia and the military person who greeted me asked 
how he could be helpful, for me that was something that I could not understand.”  He had never 
had a positive experience with a helpful government official before.  In fact, he expected to be 
asked for a bribe because this had been standard practice in the Congo.  
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The ideas about rights that respondents said they held before migrating were quite abstract.  They 
had been exposed to the global cultural package that includes rights’ protections and, to some 
extent, to the institutions that promote and guarantee them.  But most said that because these 
notions had not figured large in their lives in the Congo, they had not given much thought to 
what they actually meant for their own situations.  How, then, do refugees carry out this 
translation?  What kind of relearning occurs in the process of making concepts such as human 
rights and refugee rights relevant to one’s own experience and how do refugees learn how to put 
rights into practice?  
 
According to almost all respondents, the South African government did very little to disseminate 
information to refugees.  They said they got minimal direction at the government offices where 
they had to go to get papers.   Refugees and service providers said that the task of educating 
refugees fell almost entirely to refugee social networks and to NGOs.  These kinds of contacts 
enabled refugees to obtain the kind of information they needed to go from the global and abstract 
to the local and the concrete.  
 
Most interviewees had minimal contact with South Africans.  Besides church, there were few 
places where refugees and native-born individuals encountered one another because most 
refugees did not work or go to school.  Most people did come into contact with refugees from 
other countries in the apartment buildings where they lived or at church. These relationships 
were often complicated, however, by the sense that the Congolese were somehow more 
privileged than other groups and that refugee communities were competing with one another for 
services.  
 
Congolese refugee social networks, then, became the primary site for information dissemination.  
These networks functioned in many of the ways that the literature predicts.  Only a narrow, 
limited body of information is disseminated because, as Granovetter (1973) argues, new 
information is more likely to be introduced when individuals are embedded in weak, 
heterogeneous networks.  In contrast, most Congolese are primarily in contact with other 
Congolese. The literature also predicts that when senders and receivers of information see 
themselves as belonging to similar social and status categories (i.e. Congolese or refugee), they 
feel a sense of shared culture which enhances information spread (McAdam and Rucht 1993,  
Burt 1987, Coleman et al. 1966).  Clyde, a thirty-seven-year old male that we interviewed, who 
had more contacts outside the Congolese community than most, said he trusted other Congolese 
more and that he was more likely to feel comfortable with them because they are like him. “In 
this country there are some realities which make someone scared. Foreigners tend to understand 
each other better.”   Individuals and organizational actors also tend to be more responsive to 
information that is communicated to them by high-prestige actors (Haveman 1993, Levitt 2001).  
When pastors, or others perceived as leaders in the community communicated information, 
refugees were more likely to listen. Those who arrived in Johannesburg without any social 
connections were clearly perplexed about where to go.  Alice, a thirty-two–year old widow, said 
she came to the city not knowing a soul.  She had no idea what her rights were or what services 
were available to her.  Most people, however, arrived already acquainted with someone, or the 
person who brought them to the city introduced them to other Congolese. They learned quickly 
that they needed to go to the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to get their papers. During the 
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days and nights they spent waiting on line to be seen, refugees shared information about what 
they were entitled to and where they should go to get it.  
 
The dissemination of the “rights” piece of the global cultural package is complicated because 
certain kinds of information are easier to disseminate then others.  Much of the literature on 
global cultural diffusion makes assumptions about what is being communicated that do not hold 
in the refugee case.  First, much of this work treats what is being disseminated as an 
improvement or an innovation (Coleman et al. 1966).   It takes for granted that the senders and 
receivers of ideas can agree upon what is true and how to transmit it.  It assumes that what is 
disseminated can be easily measured and packaged.  
 
In the Congolese case, there is little agreement about who a refugee is, what he or she are entitled 
to by law, and where they could go and get these services.  Mistrust, rumors, and the expectation 
of corruption abounded.  One NGO staff member called this child’s game of telephone, 
“pavement radio”—a French expression for word-of-mouth communication—to capture how fast 
information and misinformation flows and how distorted it often becomes in the process.  
 
One source of confusion revolves around who qualifies as a refugee and about what that 
classification actually means.  Many people asked whether the Congolese had come to South 
Africa because they really had a well-founded fear of persecution or because they were economic 
migrants.   If they were just afraid for their safety why didn’t they remain in one of the 
neighboring countries like Zambia or Botswana instead of traveling all the way to South Africa?  
Service providers, in fact, had developed all kinds of strategies to sort out who was a “deserving” 
or “undeserving” refugee. They felt that many refugees embellished their stories and that there 
was a kind of rumor mill that enabled their prospective clients to learn what to include and what 
to exclude when they presented their cases.  A climate of mistrust arose because it was so 
difficult to agree upon the classification requirements and to verify the facts once these standards 
had been agreed upon.  
 
As much misinformation as information also flowed about what refugees were actually entitled 
to and what agencies were responsible for providing these services. Many Congolese thought 
that refugee relief programs should look like what they had seen at home.  If the UNHCR is 
working here, they asked, why don’t we see the trucks with the UNHCR emblem that always 
passed through our city?  They did not understand that urban and rural refugee relief services 
were structured differently and they felt cheated as a result.  Several respondents mentioned that 
they had heard refugees were treated much better in Canada, in London, or the U.S.  They had 
the impression that housing, jobs, and school fees were easy to come by in these places and that 
people were received with more respect.  They had the sense that they were somehow being 
duped and that if they could get papers to resettle in Europe or North America, their lives would 
be much easier.  
 
The South African population also had its own set of rumors and misconceptions about refugees.  
Nearly everyone we spoke with agreed that xenophobia is a major problem in South Africa.  
Most refugees had been repeatedly called kwerekwere, a disparaging term for foreigner.  Charles, 
a male in his early twenties said  
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“At the Department of Home Affairs, they will tell you, my man, this is South 
Africa, this is not home.  And they have all the power; they can decide not to 
process your case. At the Department of Home Affairs, most refugees are abused 
verbally, I was very, very angry but I could not fight back, they would just tell me 
get out of here.  I was afraid of being taken to the deportation center.  You can 
chance the streets that you walk but they are everywhere.  South Africans think 
that refugees are responsible for all crimes in their country.”  
 
Tensions ran particularly high between Black South Africans and refugees because members of 
each group saw the other as their direct competitors for housing and jobs.   Black South Africans 
felt that refugees were taking their jobs and there were “damn few jobs to begin with.”  They felt 
refugees contributed to rising rates of crime and disease.  They also asked why they still lived 
miserably in the townships while refugees lived in apartments in the downtown neighborhoods 
of Yoeville and Beara. They did not realize that as many as twelve refugees frequently slept in 
one room and that many of these buildings had been abandoned by their owners, who no longer 
felt responsible for providing basic services.  
 
Another source of misinformation and mistrust arose from confusion over organizational 
mandates.  Refugees often had a hard time distinguishing which organization was responsible for 
what kinds of services.  They grew frustrated with the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights 
(LHR), for example, because they expected them to be able to do the same things as the 
UNHCR.  Since UNHCR funds LHR, they asked, why don’t they work the same way?  In fact, 
the UNHCR was accused by some of promoting this view because it enabled them to provide 
fewer services.  
 
Furthermore, it was often unclear what refugees were allowed to do and what they could not do 
because of a disjuncture between the rules and the reality.  Although school administrators were 
supposed to waive school fees for those living below the poverty level, it was difficult for them 
to do this for the many poor South Africans that approached them, let alone refugees. Refugees 
were not allowed to open bank accounts without proper I.D. documents but some banks would 
allow them to if they could afford the initial deposit of 600 Rand (an enormous sum for most 
individuals).  
 
One of the biggest and fundamentally most difficult sources of confusion is about whether 
refugees are entitled to work.  Most people arrived certain they would find gainful employment. 
In fact, the Refugee Act of 1998 initially permitted refugees to get work permits. But by the time 
the Act was implemented in April 2000, the government had added a clause disallowing 
individuals with asylum permits to work.  The Department of Home Affairs, which issues 
asylum papers, felt South Africa was being overrun by foreigners and that it was responsible for 
keeping people out. 
 
The actual diffusion of global culture about refugee rights and how to protect them is more 
complicated than the literature would suggest.  Most of this research assumes that the ideas or 
practices that are transmitted are concrete, measurable, and easily agreed upon.  These studies 
assume that there is a single truth or fact that can be formulated in a way that is easy to 
communicate and digest.  Yet, human and refugee rights, and the services and protections one is 
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entitled to when claiming them, are abstract and difficult to measure.  Even who should 
participate in the conversation, or who rightfully qualifies as a refugee, is the subject of debate.  
In addition, what the rules say and how they are actually implemented are often purposefully 
decoupled from each other (Meyer 2003).  As a result, as much misinformation as information 
spreads about rights and the services associated with them.  Rumors, mistrust, and confusion 
make the dissemination of the “rights piece” of the global modernity package uneven and 
incomplete.  
 
V. CULTURAL DIFFUSION IN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXTS  
 
Individual refugee learning does not happen in a vacuum.  Organizations that serve refugees are 
also sites of information dissemination.  Global norms and institutions strongly influence these 
groups, transforming them into places of encounter between local and global practices.  They are 
the second layer of global cultural dissemination we examine.  
 
Post-apartheid South Africa was anxious to re-join the world community and to demonstrate to 
its neighbors that it had become a society that treated blacks and whites as equals. The 
government acceded to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
Organization of African Unity refugee protocol in January of 1996.  It also invited in a number 
of nongovernmental organizations and foundations to help address the economic and social 
challenges it faced ahead.  How should the political and social service system be reformed to 
meet the needs of the “new South Africa?” What kind of legal system should be put in place to 
regulate population movements?  That South Africa was in the process of reinventing itself at the 
same time that it faced a massive population influx brought about the convergence of several 
global cultural influences which shaped subsequent developments. Again, while many of these 
developments are in line with the literature, others represent unexpected outcomes that highlight 
the limits of global cultural homogenization.  
 
Much organizational analysis identifies the state and the professions as the principle change 
agents that spread new practices and facilitate particular lines of innovative action (Baron, et al. 
1986, Dobbin, et al. 1993).  The change agents in this study are supra-national and international 
organizations, such as United Nations’ agencies and international NGOs, which also carry global 
norms and practices that refugees are exposed to.  These values of human rights, equity, and 
transparency, and the institutional arrangements associated with them, influence South Africa’s 
response to its refugee population.  Several factors explain the convergence in organizational 
discourse and practice we observed.  
 
Coercive, mimetic, and normative processes cause institutional isomorphism and help explain 
why organizations tend to look and act alike (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  Each of these is at 
work in the South African case, emanating from local and global sources, since many 
organizational actors belong to national and international networks.  According to a professor at 
the University of Witwatersand (WITS), South Africa experienced normative pressure to make 
its domestic laws consistent with international standards after it signed on to international 
conventions.  Coercive forces were also at work because South African organizations working on 
rights issues in general depend on international funders which want them to abide by global 
standards of practice.  Furthermore, when populations are culturally-defined as similar, they tend 
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to inspire similar responses (Strang and Chang 1993).  There is a globally-recognized strategy 
for aiding urban refugees that was therefore put into place in South Africa.  
That institutions working on different sets of problems respond similarly also occurs because 
organizations that work closely together frequently import strategies from other fields. 
According to Morris (1981) and McAdam (1988), social movement actors commonly draw 
inspiration and strategies from other movements.  We observed this frequently in our 
conversations with NGOs and government agencies.  
 
First, the borrowing of ideas and discourse was observed.  Respect for rights and racial equality 
were high priorities for most of the staff we interviewed.  These principles had already been a 
central concern to some respondents and were readily taken up by others who wanted to 
demonstrate that South Africa was capable of assuming its place among democratic nations.  A 
staff member from the Department of Social Development (DSD), in charge of protecting 
unaccompanied refugee children, claimed that everyone had become very rights oriented with 
the arrival of the new South Africa. “The whole of South Africa,” she said, “has become very 
aware of rights and trying to create a society where we can be as sensitive to rights of people as 
we can.”  Documents such as The International Convention on the Rights of Children made her 
job easier because protecting children became and important priority when the new South 
African constitution was written. 
 
Borrowing ideas and discourses also happened because many NGOs belonged to international 
organizational networks that disseminated global culture and values. The Human Rights 
Committee, for example, is an international watchdog organization that is funded by HEX (a 
religious NGO), the Open Society Foundation, and the European Union Foundation for Human 
Rights.  One respondent, a lawyer, spoke about the models of practice he learned through his 
connections with the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights’ international network, and the 
colleagues he meets at international conferences. When he worked on the Refugee Act of 1998, 
he lobbied hard for the inclusion of international best practices. He also worked to ensure that the 
new South African constitution was consistent with international conventions.  
 
In the South African case, then, the tenets of global culture, and particularly the rights piece, 
receive support from many corners.  Refugee relief workers are exposed to these ideas and 
practices through the UN and NGO networks that they work with or that fund their activities.  
Global values and practices also spread through the many agencies working in the country to 
bring “modern, democratic, liberal practices” to its political and legal systems. Both domestic 
and international actors espouse accountability and legitimacy, the rhetoric of rights, and racial 
equality. Because there is synergy between the ideas and practices flowing through these 
multiple, sometimes overlapping networks, they mutually reinforce each other.  
 
But several factors limit the extent to which global cultural convergence actually occurs, even 
when it is fostered by multiple organizational catalysts.  Most important are local socioeconomic 
conditions and history.  Some respondents suggested that South Africans have had so little 
experience sharing borders with friendly neighbors that they are particularly receptive to 
misinformation about population flows. They even suggested that the government purposefully 
fuels this confusion. They cited a study by the Human Sciences Research Council, a quasi-
government agency, which exaggerated the numbers of illegal workers in the country.  Although 
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the report was later retracted, and the data it was based on declared flawed, the perception of an 
uncontrollable influx still holds.  “Liberal, democratic nations have control over their borders, 
live peacefully with their neighbors, and are willing to shelter a certain number faced by 
involuntary exile,” a staff member at the LHR said, “but South Africa’s history and national 
perceptions about its ability to determine its own sovereignty work against that.”  
 
A more insurmountable obstacle to global cultural adoption is that many of those who would 
need to put these ideas into practice, and move South Africa beyond rhetoric to a new reality, are 
unwilling or unable to do so.  There are remnants of the “old South Africa,” deeply entrenched in 
the country’s labor force, who balk at greater equity and inclusiveness.  Although the ethos 
espoused may be different, many of the “street-level bureaucrats” who are the public face of 
government agencies have not changed their views. “There are,” according to a staffperson at the 
DSD, “many old-style workers within the new South Africa and this definitely limits the 
possibilities for change.”  She believes it will take several generations before the old modus 
operandi disappears entirely.  In South Africa, then, the disconnect between the norms that have 
been put in place and the service providers who fail to act upon them thwarts the global cultural 
dissemination process.  
 
In addition, the South African refugee relief apparatus was initially established to repatriate 
former exiles so they could return quickly and become part of the new government. The UNHCR 
developed a close, cooperative relationship with the government as a result.  According to 
several respondents, the UNHCR has been reluctant to take anti-government stances and to 
advocate effectively for refugees. It has not developed its own plan for counteracting what they 
feel has been the government’s half-hearted overtures toward the refugee population. The fact 
that the UNHCR, one of the principal carriers and catalysts of refugee rights and practices, has 
stopped short of fulfilling its role creates additional obstacles to global cultural adoption. 
 
Mistrust of government and law enforcement that is still pervasive among South Africans and 
refugees alike also creates barriers to global cultural diffusion.  Most respondents perceive South 
African institutions as weak and biased.  How could agencies like that, they ask, ever act as 
effective guarantors of equal rights?  Prospective clients even approach organizations that try to 
espouse the values and practices of global modernity with mistrust.  
 
Finally, the South African government faces real political and economic obstacles to the 
implementation of the refugee rights piece of the global values package.  In 2001, the country’s 
unemployment rate was estimated at 37%.  The prevalence rate for HIV/AIDs among the adult 
population was estimated at 20% in 2000 and over 300,000 people are said to die each year 
(World Fact Book 2002).  Although the country is abundantly endowed with resources and has 
well developed financial, legal, communications, energy, and transport sectors, growth has not 
been strong enough to cut into high unemployment and daunting economic problems that persist 
from the apartheid era (World Fact Book 2002).  Government and NGO officials alike agreed 
that it was nearly impossible for South Africa to fulfill its commitment to refugees since there 
were so many needy among its own.  The perception that the government gave more to refugees 
than to black South Africans would seriously undermine any political coalition.  
 
 12
In sum, multi-sited, multi-layered organizations are also channels for cultural diffusion.  The 
influx of refugees into South Africa coincided with the country’s re-entry into the world 
community.  South Africa wanted to signal to other nations that it had become “the New South 
Africa” which respected global values including protecting refugees. Many NGOs working in the 
country espoused values that were also supportive of refugee relief.  But while these conditions 
would appear to favor the adaptation of global culture, local conditions and practices impede its 
wholesale acceptance.  The economy, racial inequality, a lack of institutional will, and 
government corruption restricted how far the translation of the global to the local could actually 
go.  The adaptation of “modern” forms and norms is decoupled from actual practice so that the 
South African government can look like it has undertaken reforms without actually doing so 
(Meyer 2003).  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Transnational actors who promote a package of democratic, liberal, modern values face inherent 
obstacles to their diffusion that are brought to light by the Congolese refugee experience.  First, 
global cultural diffusion becomes more complicated when what is disseminated and to whom is 
not unclear.  In the Congolese refugee case, as many falsehoods as facts about refugee rights and 
the services they are entitled to are communicated and there was often little agreement about 
what rights actually are.  This experience suggests an important corrective to the literature on 
cultural dissemination which assumes that in most cases, what is communicated is true and easy 
to package. The Congolese refugee experience also highlights the limits of global cultural 
adaptation.  Even when institutional actors operating at multiple levels promulgate global ideas 
and practices, local realities limit the extent to which they take hold.  Local actors “talked the 
talk” of global modernity, and had appropriated many of its trappings, but local conditions made 
the “rights” piece of the global values package is less amenable to hybridization than other 
global cultural forms.  Not all elements of global culture as equally adaptable as others.  
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